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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHT OF STATES TO PUNISH FOR NARconc AnDIarION.-The defendant was convicted for violating a Californa

be under the
statute which made it a misdemeanor to "use,
"' He was
influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics.
sentenced to a short prison term as provided m the statute. The trial
court's instruction stated that the jury need not believe that the
defendant took narcotics within the jurisdiction, but only that he
was addicted to narcotics. This was affirmed by-a California appellate
court. Appeal was then taken to the United States Supreme Court.
Held: Reversed. A state law which impnsons a person merely because
he is addicted to narcotics inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370

U.S. 660 (1962).

-

The Court's decision rests upon the premise that narcotic addiction
is not a crime but a sickness. In a six-to-two opinion, the majority
reasoned that although a short jail term cannot be construed as cruel
and unusual when considered in the abstract, it becomes so when the
punishment is for being sick. The medical profession generally
adheres to the view that an addict is a sick person. 2 The addict is
dependent on narcotics both psychologically and physiologically "Psychological dependence is defined as "a substitution of the use
[U] se of the drug
of the drug for other types of adaptive behavior.
becomes the answer to all of life s problems."4 Physical dependence
is defined as an altered physiologic state which requires the habitual
use of narcotics sufficient to prevent the onset of withdrawal sickness.5
Withdrawal sickness refers to the physical and mental anguish the
addict suffers when he is deprived of narcotics."
Once physically addicted, the addict's life becomes centered
around his compulsion for narcotics. The addict fears withdrawal
above all else-probably even death. 7 Fear of punishment will not
1Cal. Health &Safety Code §11721.

-deRopp, Drugs and the Mind 157-59 (1957).
i Weston, Narcotics, U.S.A. 47-48 (1952).

4 Isbell

and White, Clinical Characteristicsof Addiction, 14 Am. J. Med. 558

(1953).
5IMid.
6 See deRopp, op. cit. supra note 2,at 152-54.
7 Cantor, The Crimnal Law and The Narcotics Problem, 51 J. Cnm. L., C.
& P.S. 512, 523 (1961).
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deter the addict from either seeking or using narcotics. 8 Deterrence
presupposes rationality, and the addict is not rational. Since addiction
is considered a sickness rather than a crime and fear of punishment
is of no use as a deterrent, it seems that a sound decision was reached
in the principal case.
But a distinction should be made between addicts and non-addicted
users. Although non-addicted users may be somewhat psychologically
dependent on narcotics, they are not physiologically dependent to the
point of suffering withdrawal sickness if narcotics are withheldY These
non-addicted users, who may be thrill-seekers searching for a new
adventure or teen-agers using narcotics to fit into a particular
delinquent sub-culture, 10 help support the illegal trade and make
themselves susceptible to becoming addicts.ii Unlike addicts, they
do not experience an overwhelming compulsion to take narcotics.
Since the non-addicited user is not considered to be sick by medical
criteria and has the capability of thinking rationally, the law recogmzes
that the fear of imprisonment is a substantial deterrent to their using
narcotics. In order to convict a non-addicted user, the prosecution
must only prove actual use within the jurisdiction. 2
Conceding that the addict should not be imprisoned, what then
is the most effective method to handle hIs problem? There is a wide
variance of medical opinion in the United States as to the best ways of
treating the addict. Two of the most frequently advocated methods
are (1) a system of legal distribution of narcotics to addicts, and (2)
a system of compulsory civil commitments.is The legal distribution
plan is in existence in England. Under ths plan clinics are established
to provide the addict with narcotics sufficient to prevent withdrawal
sickness. The addict is not required to stay in these clinics. The
proponents of this plan point out that legal distribution curtails the
illegal traffic in narcotics and reduces the need for the addict to
engage in illegal activities to obtain money to buy narcotcs.i 4 The
opponents of this plan argue that it is unworkable and immoral. It is
unworkable because, although the addict is kept free from discomfort
by the legall" administered narcotics, he still desires more to provide
the sought after euphoria. It is immoral in that it merely perpetuates
8 A.B.A.-A.M.A. Joint Committee on Narcotic Drugs, Drug Addiction: Crime
or Disease? 85 (1961).
o id. at 25.
10 Narcotics, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 55-56 (1957).
11 Cantor, supra note 7, at 527.
12 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 663 (1962).
13 Eldndge. Narcotics and the Law 108-15 (1962).
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the illness from which the addict suffers. The addict will not be
motivated to seek a cure as long as he is receiving narcotcs. 15
Some states have adopted the compulsory civil commitment plan
for treating addicts. 16 Under this plan the addict is actually confined
to a hospital. During this period he is gradually taken off narcotics
and attempts are made to rehabilitate him. This seems to be a sound
solution to the problem but it is presently impracticable because of
the lack of adequate facilities. The only institutions built especially
to treat addicts are in Lexington, Kentucky, and Forth Worth, Texas;
in addition, a small hospital is maintained in New York City for juveniles.17 One reason for this present lack of facilities is that the public
is unaware of the nature and magnitude of the addiction problem. As
long as this unawareness exists, compulsory civil commitment will
remain impracticable.
The status of addiction is a sickness and not a crime. Providing
facilities to cure this sickness is a responsibility of the public. The
state and federal governments should take immediate steps to educate
the public about this problem so that a progressive plan of treatment
and rehabilitaton can be undertaken.
William L. Montague

TOiRTS-STANDAiRD OF CARE FOR MoToRIsTs AT RAILROAD CRossINGs-A
CASE FOR ComPARAIvE NEGLIGENCE-The decedent approached defendant's railroad crossing on a two-lane, paved, county road on a
clear afternoon. Two railroad signs and an official county "stop"
sign were posted to warn motorists of the crossing. From the "stop"
sign, which was ten feet from the nearer of the two tracks, a motorist
could see only 140 feet down the track to the right. Because of weeds
growing on the defendant's right-of-way vision beyond 140 feet was
impossible until the front wheels of the decedents automobile were
almost on the first track. As he was crossing the tracks, his automobile
was struck from the right by the defendant's train which was going
45 miles per hour. There were no eye-witnesses to the actual impact.
The lower court entered judgment for the decedent on the jury s verdict
of $162,121.50. Held: Reversed with directions to enter a judgment
for defendant. Although the defendant was negligent in permitting
the weeds to obscure vision, the court found that the decedent could
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See, e.g., Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code §§5350-61.
17 Eldndge, op. cit. supra note 13, at 113.
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